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1 Introduction 
1.1 The intervention in Somalia 
The intervention in Somalia represents a historical moment in the development of 
humanitarian intervention as it was the first time the United Nations Security Council 
authorized a Chapter VII intervention, without the consent of a government, for 
explicitly humanitarian reasons.  
 
The humanitarian catastrophe the Somali people experienced between 1991 and 1992 
was a result of the civil war and the breakdown of the government after a coup by two 
clan leaders, Aideed and Mahdi, in January 1991. After taking over the government, a 
war broke out between Aideed and Mahdi which split the capital Mogadishu into two 
armed camps. The civil war devastated Somalia‘s agricultural production and, combined 
with a drought, killed between 300,000 and 350,000 people in 1992.
1
  
 
On 3 December 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794, which authorized 
the use of force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, stating that ―the 
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia…constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security‖.2 The resolution allowed for an intervention, and 
was followed by the U.S. led Operation Restore Hope and subsequent United Nations 
Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II). 
 
Attempts to reach a ceasefire proved difficult, and the UN saw the need to support 
Somalia in building a constitutional state. This resulted in Security Council Resolution 
814. As the most ambitious mandate ever given to a UN mission, Resolution 814 
                                                 
 
1
 N.J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford University 
Press, New York 2000) p.174. 
2
 Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement  
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authorized the forces to rebuild the state.
3
 However, as the U.S. forces started to 
experience casualties, the intervention faced strong criticism from the U.S. Congress 
and President Clinton decided to withdraw all U.S. forces.
4
 Additionally, the UN 
attempts at state-building faced heavy opposition, so that, by February 1995, the UN 
had also withdrawn from Somalia.  
 
The aftermath of the intervention gave rise to a discussion about the intervention‘s 
success. Some claim that the intervention came too late and that the starvation had 
already passed its worst point by the time Resolution 794 was adopted.
5
 On the other 
hand, the Secretary- General claimed in a report to the Security Council on 26 January 
1993, that the mission had been fulfilled and humanitarian aid had reached those most 
in need.
6
 The Refuge Study Group concluded in a report in November 1994 that around 
four million Somalis had faced food insecurity and risk of disease between 1992 and 
1993. Out of this number ―330,000…were at imminent risk of death…Of those at 
imminent risk, 110,000 lives were sustained (deaths averted) due to health, food and 
other interventions that reached over one million Somalis‖.7 
 
The significance of the intervention and its lawfulness also became a subject of debate 
and will be discussed in this thesis. 
  
1.2 Aims and Purposes 
This thesis will address the legal aspects of humanitarian intervention, and the 
development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a possible legalized use of 
force in international law. The thesis has two main purposes: First it will look at the 
legal material concerning humanitarian intervention and address the question of whether 
or not the intervention in Somalia was legal. Secondly, the thesis will discuss the 
                                                 
 
3
 Security Council Resolution 814, 26 March 1993, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement  
4
 J.L. Hirsch and R.B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping, (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995) p.129 cited in Wheeler, supra note 
1, p.199. 
5
 M. Bryden, ‘Somalia: The Wages of Failure’ 94 Current History (1995) p.148. 
6
 Wheeler, supra note 1, p.188. 
7
 Quoted in Wheeler, supra note 1, p.189. 
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significance the intervention has had for later interventions and for the legal status of 
humanitarian intervention in general.  
1.3 Method and Material 
The thesis will discuss the above mentioned questions using positivistic legal methods. 
The traditional starting point in international law is Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Article 38 lists international conventions, 
international custom and general principles of law as primary sources. Judicial decisions 
and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists are cited as secondary sources.
8
  
Consequently I have studied treaty law, case law, customary law, and legal doctrines. I 
also studied the works of prominent scholars such as Nicholas J. Wheeler, Adam 
Roberts and Simon Chesterman. 
 
In interpreting international conventions and treaties, the thesis will use the method 
established in the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties.
9
  
 
In regards to humanitarian intervention, the starting point is the United Nations Charter 
Article 2(4), and thus this thesis studies the Charter in depth. Resolutions by the 
Security Council and the General Assembly are important in understanding the Charter, 
and emphasis has been laid on such resolutions. Security Council resolutions are legally 
binding, while resolutions by the General Assembly are non-binding. As not legally 
binding, General Assembly resolutions are part of the body of international law referred 
to as soft law. Soft law may consist of standards, commitments, declarations and 
                                                 
 
8
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945) Article 38 available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0  
9
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969) Article 31 “1. A treaty should be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall compromise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be 
taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
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resolutions, which do not impose legally binding obligations.
10
 Although soft law does 
not stipulate any rights or obligations, soft law has been important in international law, 
as it has often laid the ground for formulation of treaties and customary law.
11
        
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The issue of humanitarian intervention includes both the aspect of legality and the 
aspect of legitimacy. This thesis will focus on the aspect of legality, but the issue of 
legitimacy is at times intertwined with legality and will thus have an impact on this. The 
issue of legitimacy will therefore be considered when it is relevant. 
 
Since the Security Council authorized the intervention in Somalia, this thesis will not go 
in depth on the subject of unauthorized interventions.   
 
Furthermore, the thesis will only concentrate on those interventions that involve the use 
of force and will not deal with other interferences that are sometimes also defined as 
humanitarian interventions. 
 
1.5 Terminology 
The legal status of humanitarian intervention has been a subject of debate among legal 
scholars.
12
 Part of the disagreement can be rooted in the definition of humanitarian 
intervention. One recognized and well-cited definition is Sean Murphy‘s definition of 
humanitarian intervention as the ―threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or 
                                                                                                                                               
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”  Available 
at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf  
10
 A. Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001) pp.160-161. 
11
 For more on soft law as a part of international law see for instance Ibid; M. Dixon, Textbook on 
International Law (Blackstone Press Limited, London 3ed 1996) pp.44-45. 
12
 See for instance J. Shen et. al ‘The Non-Intervention Principles and Humanitarian Interventions under 
International Law’ 7:1 International Legal Theory (2001) pp.1-90; A. Roberts, ‘The so-called ‘Right’ of 
Humanitarian Intervention’ 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (2000) pp.3-51; S. 
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2001) pp.45-87.  
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international organizations primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the 
target state from widespread deprivations of international recognized human rights‖.13 
Although this is the most accepted definition, similar criteria can also be found in other 
definitions.
14
 
 
As the definitions on humanitarian intervention show, most agree that humanitarian 
intervention is carried out with aims of ending widespread deprivations of international 
recognized human rights of individuals other than its own citizens. This element has 
also been emphasized by the Security Council when authorizing interventions. For 
instance, Resolution 794 points to the ―magnitude of the human tragedy in Somalia‖ 
and ―reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law‖.15  
 
The controversy relates partially to the use of force in humanitarian interventions. Some 
argue that interventions which resort to force cannot be defined as humanitarian 
interventions.
16
 Others define humanitarian intervention without reference to the use of 
force,
17
 thereby placing interventions by other means under the term humanitarian 
intervention. However, most interventions that claim to be humanitarian interventions 
do resort to force, and most definitions include the use of force.
18
 Furthermore, it is also 
mainly in regards to interventions involving the use of force that the controversy around 
humanitarian interventions occurs.  
                                                 
 
13
 S.D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996) pp.11-12. The definition is also used by several other legal 
scholars, see for instance P.C. Simons, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Review of Literature’ 01-2 
Ploughshares Working Paper (2001) p.2; H. Rahmouni, ‘Searching for a Legal International For 
Humanitarian Intervention’ available at: http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=4826     
14
 See for instance Kirchner’s definition ”coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in 
another state without the consent of the latter for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross 
and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” in S. Kirchner,’The 
Human Rights Dimensions of International Peace and Security and Humanitarian Intervention after 
9/11’, published 24 October 2004,p 12, available at: http://jha.ac/articles/a143.pdf and Roberts’ 
definition “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state 
without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death 
among the inhabitants” in Roberts, supra note 12, p.5. 
15
 See note 2. 
16
 For support of this view see for instance A. Ryniker, ‘The ICRC’s position on ”humanitarian 
intervention”’ 83 International Review of the Red Cross (2001) pp.527-532.  
17
 B. Parekh, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’ 18/1 International Political Science Review (1997) 
p.54. 
18
 See notes 13 and 14. 
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Interventions are usually carried out without the consent of the host state. Although this 
is somewhat debated,
19
 it is commonly understood and has been highlighted by several 
scholars.
20
   
 
Moreover, both collective interventions with prior UN Security Council authorization 
and unilateral interventions by one or more states without prior authorization have been 
defined as humanitarian interventions.  Since these situations are both relevant to the 
discussion of the legality of humanitarian intervention, in this thesis the term 
humanitarian intervention will apply to both these situations.  
 
This shows that a humanitarian intervention has to be conducted with aims of ending 
widespread deprivations of international recognized human rights of individuals other 
than its own citizens, without the consent from the state being intervened and involving 
the use of armed force by international organizations or states. For the purpose of this 
thesis, these elements will be used to define a humanitarian intervention.   
2 Generally on humanitarian intervention 
2.1 Development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
The origins of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention date back to the 17th-century 
international lawyer, Hugo Grotius. With his book De Jure Belli est Pacis, Grotius has 
been named the Father of International Law. Grotius claimed that the principle of 
sovereignty could be restricted by principles of humanity and considered that: ―whether 
a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries 
by their ruler…if a tyrant…practices atrocities towards his subject, which no just man 
                                                 
 
19
 See for instance Chesterman, supra note 12 pp. 9, 66-69; Roberts, supra note 12 pp.5-6. 
20
 See note 14. 
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can approve, the right of human social connexion is not cut off in such case…It would 
not follow that others may not take up arms for them‖.21 
 
The tendency of states to intervene in less civilized states is typical for the first cases of 
possible humanitarian interventions occurring in the 19th century, such as the invasion 
of Turkey in 1830 by Great Britain, France and Russia, and the invasion of Syria in 
1860 and 61 by France.
22
  
 
During the Cold War, there are three interventions that have been discussed as possible 
humanitarian interventions; India‘s intervention in Pakistan, Vietnam‘s intervention in 
Cambodia and the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda. However, none of these 
interventions was justified on the grounds of humanitarian intervention; instead they 
invoked claims of self-defense.
23
  
 
The end of the Cold War led to the end of the conflict between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, making it easier for the Security Council to act. The Council played a 
central role after the Cold War, authorizing interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo.  
 
The intervention in Iraq in 1991 is significant in the development of humanitarian 
intervention because it was the first time the Security Council recognized that internal 
repression could have transboundary consequences that threatened ―international peace 
and security‖.24 
 
While the Security Council played an important part in the intervention in Somalia, it 
became a bystander in the genocide in Rwanda a few years later. The UN withdrew 
most of its peacekeeping force; the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
                                                 
 
21
 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli est Pacis, quoted in F.K. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) p.35. 
22
 R.B. Lillich, International Human Rights Problems of Law, Policy and Practice (Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1991) pp.596-597. 
23
 See Wheeler, supra note 1, pp.60-65, 85-89, 118-119. 
24
 Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement  
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(UNAMIR),
 25
 leaving the civilians to their own fate. In the aftermath of the genocide 
the UN received massive criticism for its failure to take action.
26
   
 
The discussion about humanitarian intervention took a new turn in March 1999, when 
NATO went to war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and started its bombing 
campaign in Kosovo. This was the first time a group of states justified the use of force 
explicitly on humanitarian grounds and intervened without Security Council 
authorization. NATO justified its intervention in Kosovo by arguing that the 
intervention aimed to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, that NATO‘s credibility was at 
stake, that the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo posed a long-term threat to European security, 
and that NATO‘s actions were in conformity with existing Security Council 
resolutions.
27
 
 
A more recent development in the field of humanitarian intervention is the doctrine of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It is an attempt to reconcile the concept of 
sovereignty with a state‘s duty to protect its citizens. It had its starting point in the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was 
established in 2000. The Commission was created as a response to UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan‘s concerns on how to respond to massive human rights violations. 
In 2001, the Commission issued its report, The Responsibility to Protect,
28
 where it 
recommended to the Secretary-General that he initiate steps to develop a doctrine on 
humanitarian intervention and laid down the principles the doctrine should be based on.  
The report viewed sovereignty as an obstacle to humanitarian intervention and wanted 
the term humanitarian intervention to be replaced with a new responsibility to protect. 
Thus, sovereignty was not conceived of as a right, but rather as a duty to protect.  
In 2004 the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change took up the report 
and spoke of ―an emerging norm of collective international responsibility‖ in the face of 
                                                 
 
25
 Security Council Resolution 912, 21 April 1994, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/190/85/PDF/N9419085.pdf?OpenElement  
26
 Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, 16 December 1999, S/1999/1257, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement  
27
 Wheeler, supra note 1, p.265. 
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human right abuses.
29
 A modified version of the R2P was acknowledged by the General 
Assembly in the Outcome Document at the UN World Summit in 2005.
30
  
The significance of the R2P for the development of humanitarian intervention is limited 
for two reasons: First and foremost, the Security Council has not yet adopted the R2P, 
consequently it does not represent legally binding criteria. Secondly, the R2P covers 
situations in which the intervening states do not resort to force, and thus embraces 
situations other than just humanitarian interventions.  
 
2.2  The United Nations Charter 
2.2.1  The United Nations Charter and its Purposes 
The United Nations Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945.  The Charter is a 
treaty between the states parties to it, and founded the United Nations as a multipurpose 
organization, replacing the former League of Nations.
31
   
 
The United Nations Charter does not explicitly address the question of humanitarian 
intervention. However, the Charter sets out a number of Purposes and Principles which 
are decisive for the right of humanitarian intervention. The main purposes of the Charter 
are those listed in Article 1.
32
 The first is to maintain international peace and security. In 
order to achieve this, Article 1(1) calls for the peaceful settlements of disputes and to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. 
Article 1(2) states the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, while 
the promotion and encouragement of the respect of human rights have their foundation 
in Article 1(3) of the Charter. Article 1(4) emphasizes the necessity of consensus in 
order to reach these common goals.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
28
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (2001) 
available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp  
29
 Report of The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004) para 201, available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/  
30
 General Assembly Resolution 60/1 15 September 2005, World Summit Outcome, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement  
31
 L.M. Goodrich The United Nations (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1960) pp.28-29. 
32
 Charter of the United Nations (1945) Article 1, available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/  
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Articles 1(2) – 1(4) are seen both as means to maintain international peace and security 
and as purposes in their own right.
33
 
 
2.2.2  The Principle of Non-intervention 
The UN Charter Article 2(7) establishes the principle of non-intervention by stating that 
―[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state…but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII‖. The principle of non-intervention has also been upheld by the UN 
in several other instances. For example, in the non-binding Friendly Relations 
Declaration, the General Assembly is ―[c]onvinced that the strict observance by States 
of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential 
condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the 
practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, 
but also leads to the creation of situations which threatens international peace and 
security‖.34  
 
The principle of non-intervention has also received general recognition as a principle of 
customary international law, established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States 
case.
35
 The case is based on a suit by Nicaragua against the U.S. for violating the 
principles of non-intervention and non-use of force in supporting a group of Nicaraguan 
rebels with financial, military and economic assistance. In its decision, the ICJ observed 
that ―[t]he principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to 
conduct its affairs without outside interference…the Court considers that it is part and 
parcel of customary international law‖ (para 202). 
 
                                                 
 
33
 B.Simma et. al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary Volume 1 (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2002, 2.ed) p.40. 
34
 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Res. 2625, 24 October 
1970, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement  
35
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. The United States) 27 June 
1986, ICJ, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=nus&case=70&k=66  
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Both as a principle of the UN Charter and as a principle of customary law, the rule of 
non- intervention stands as an obstacle to any humanitarian intervention not authorized 
by the Security Council. Furthermore, the principle of non-intervention has by some 
been considered a part of jus cogens,
36
 meaning it is a peremptory norm that cannot be 
modified or derogated from. The principle has been the subject of discussion in many 
interventions, as states question whether or not the matter at stake is ―essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction‖ of the state being intervened. The principle was heavily 
debated during the adoption of Security Council Resolution 688 in connection with the 
intervention in Iraq. Some states on the Council worried that the resolution would 
violate Article 2(7) and therefore set a dangerous precedent for future Security Council 
actions. The states in support of the resolution relied on the argument that the 
transboundary implications constituted a threat to ―international peace and security‖.37 
Regarding the intervention in Somalia, the principle was discussed, but did not become 
an obstacle to intervention as the Security Council took the view that, since the 
government had ceased to exist, there was no breach of the non-intervention rule.
38
  
 
2.2.3 The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by establishing that ―[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations‖. The Charter has two 
exceptions to this, namely when acting in self-defense in accordance with Article 51, or 
when acting with the authorization of the Security Council as set out in Chapter VII.  
 
The wording in Article 2(4) can be interpreted as an absolute prohibition of all other use 
of force against other states. However, some argue that humanitarian intervention is not 
covered by Article 2(4). One of them Lillich, points out that one of the Charter‘s main 
purposes is the protection of human rights, and humanitarian intervention is therefore 
                                                 
 
36
 See the debate around this in International Legal Theory, supra note 12; See also Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sette-Camara in Nicaragua v The United States p.199. 
37
 Wheeler, supra note 1 p.144. 
38
 Ibid.,p.200. This will be elaborated in section 4.1. 
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not ―inconsistent‖ with the Charter.39 Accordingly, humanitarian intervention is then 
only prohibited by Article 2(4) if the intervention affects the ―territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state‖. It is argued that a humanitarian intervention seeks 
neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the state 
involved.
40
 Against this interpretation is first and foremost that the achievements 
accomplished by a humanitarian intervention will usually require a new government and 
in some cases even secession, and the intervention thereby affects the State‘s ―territorial 
integrity or political independence‖. Furthermore, the majority holds that Article 2(4) 
prohibits all use of force,
41
 and thus protects states from all forms of forceful 
interference by other states. A support to this interpretation is also that the phrase 
―against the territorial integrity or political independence‖ was added to Article 2(4) by 
the request from small states wanting a stronger guarantee against intervention.
42
  
 
The argument that the use of force is allowed if it is not directed against the ―territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state‖ was made by Great Britain in the Corfu 
Channel case.
43 
However, the plea that a minesweeping operation did not threaten the 
―territorial integrity or political independence‖ of Albania was dismissed by the ICJ. 
 
Article 2(4) thereby prohibits all use of force unless authorized by the Security Council 
or when acting in self-defense.  
 
It is established in international customary law that the use of force also has to meet the 
criteria of necessity and proportionality. Necessity is commonly described as 
                                                 
 
39
 Lillich, supra note 22 p.598. 
40
 Ibid., p.585. 
41
 See for instance Simma, supra note 33, p.123; R. Goodman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts 
for War’, 100:1 The American Journal of International Law (2006) pp.111-112; Chesterman, supra note 
12 p.47-50. 
42
 Lillich, supra note 22 p.591. 
43
 Corfu Channel, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), 9 April 1949, 
available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&code=cc&case=1&k=cd  
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demanding that the use of force must be the last resort,
44
 while proportionality prohibits 
force that is excessive in relation to the advantage anticipated.
45
 
 
The question is whether this applies to Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. 
 
The UN Charter Article 42 states explicitly that the Council can take such action as 
―may be necessary‖ to maintain or restore international peace and security. The ordinary 
meaning of the words thus indicates that it is in the Security Council‘s own discretion to 
determine whether its measures are necessary.    
 
The criterion of proportionality is not mentioned as such in the Charter. Nevertheless, 
Articles 39 and 42 demand that forceful actions shall only be used in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression. These articles can thereby be read as constituting a 
criterion of proportionality.
46
 However, Article 42 allows for military action if the 
Council ―consider‖ that measures under Article 41 are inadequate, which seems to leave 
a broad margin of appreciation to the Security Council.
47
 
 
Article 1(1) of the Charter states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to take 
collective measures to maintain international peace and security ―in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law‖. This implies that the criteria of international 
customary law shall apply to the Council‘s decisions.  
 
The question of necessity and proportionality in regards to the Council‘s decisions has 
also been debated in legal literature. On the one hand, it is argued that the Council is in 
general free not to respect international law when acting under Chapter VII.
48
 On the 
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other hand, the majority of legal authors claim that the Council is subject to 
international law regarding its decisions, and any decision to resort to force is thereby 
governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality.
49
 
 
Furthermore, if the principles of necessity and proportionality are applied, it is likely 
that the Security Council will authorize the use of force in fewer cases, which will be in 
conformity with the prohibition against the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention.  
 
Based on the UN Charter and legal writings on the interpretations of the Charter, the 
conclusion is that the criteria of necessity and proportionality apply to the decisions of 
the Security Council, though with a broad margin of appreciation for the Council.  
 
In international customary law, necessity and proportionality apply not only to the 
decision to use force, but also to the way force is used when authorized.
50
 
 
It is established that operations that have been authorized by the Security Council, but 
remaining under national control, such as Operation Restore Hope, are governed by 
their international humanitarian law obligations.
51
 Such operations thereby have to 
apply the principles of necessity and proportionality in their use of force.  
 
After the adoption of the Charter, it was somewhat debated whether forces under UN 
control, such as UNOSOM II, should be required to apply the principles of necessity 
and proportionality.
52
 This was clarified by the UN Secretary-General in 1999 when the 
Secretary- General stated in a bulletin that the ―fundamental principles and rules of 
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international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United 
Nations forces‖.53 The bulletin references the principles of necessity and proportionality 
in that it prohibits damage that would be ―excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated‖,54 and ―methods of warfare which may cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering‖.55  
 
Also, with considerations for the consistency of the Charter, the principles of necessity 
and proportionality should apply to the forces carrying out the authority vested in them 
by the Council, since the same criteria apply to the Council‘s decision to resort to force.  
 
The principles of necessity and proportionality therefore apply to forces authorized by 
the Security Council, whether under UN or state control.  
2.3  Authority 
2.3.1  United Nations Security Council 
An important question in the debate on humanitarian intervention is the question of who 
should have the authority to authorize an intervention. The most obvious answer is the 
United Nations Security Council, which can authorize interventions through its Chapter 
VII powers. The Security Council authorized the intervention in Somalia, as it has done 
in several other occasions.  
 
The Council‘s experience in authorizing the use of force and its position in the 
international community would make it the most appropriate body to authorize an 
intervention. This was also emphasized by the ICISS in its report on the Responsibility 
to Protect, where the Commission sad that it is ―in […] no doubt that there is no better 
or more appropriate body than the Security Council to deal with military intervention 
issues for human protection purposes‖.56  
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Since the Council authorizes the use of force in other circumstances, considerations to 
the consistency of the system and the legitimacy of the intervention, make it obvious 
that any humanitarian intervention should be authorized by the Security Council. 
 
2.3.2 Other Means of Authority  
Problems may occur when the Security Council is unable to achieve the required 
number of votes to authorize an intervention and in situations in which states on the 
Council are unwilling to intervene. In these situations, the question is whether or not 
other bodies can authorize an intervention or if states can act unilaterally. 
 
The General Assembly has, in such situations, powers to recommend collective 
measures through its Uniting for Peace Procedures if there is a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression. Those procedures are laid down in General 
Assembly Resolution 377. The resolution reaffirms the Security Council‘s primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but is conscious 
that a failure by the Council to fulfill its responsibility does not relive the member states 
of their responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
57
 The resolution 
specifically says that the General Assembly can recommend the use of armed forces in 
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, meaning that the Assembly can 
recommend its member states to intervene if necessary. However, it is important to 
notice that the General Assembly‘s resolutions are not legally binding, and a resolution 
under the Uniting for Peace Procedures will not impose any obligations on the member 
states.  
Furthermore, it would be difficult to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the 
General Assembly in a situation where there is no majority in the Security Council. 
Still, if the General Assembly can gain the necessary majority, an authorization from the 
Assembly would have more legitimacy and thus be a better alternative than an 
unauthorized intervention.  
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Other bodies of authority could be regional arrangements or agencies. The UN Charter 
Article 53(1) provides that the Security Council may make use of ―regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action‖. The article further states that no such 
enforcement action shall be taken ―without the authorization of the Security Council‖. 
This makes regional arrangements dependent on authorization from the Security 
Council. In a situation where the Council cannot gain the necessary majority or is 
unwilling to act, it may seem unlikely that the Council would gain majority to authorize 
the use of force by regional arrangement or agencies. Yet, there might be situations 
where regional bodies are the most appropriate to intervene and would therefore be 
authorized by the Council. In such situations the regional body would have the legality 
and legitimacy of a Security Council authorization and thereby have the authority to 
intervene. 
 
2.3.3  Unauthorized Interventions 
An unauthorized intervention cannot gain legality through the UN Charter.  
There is no treaty that deals directly with humanitarian interventions. Still, numerous 
treaties protect human rights, such as the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
58
 These and other treaties set out a 
set of human rights that shall be granted to all human beings, but they do not give the 
international community any right to intervene if those human rights are being violated. 
The convention that comes closest to establishing any enforcement measures is the 
Genocide Convention.
59
 In Article 1 of the Convention, the international community 
undertakes to ―prevent and punish‖ genocide. However, Article VIII of the Convention 
puts this responsibility within the UN system as it provides that ―[a]ny Contracting 
Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action 
under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention 
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and suppression of acts of genocide…‖. The Genocide Convention does thereby not 
legalize unauthorized interventions.  
 
The question is then if unauthorized humanitarian interventions are legal as a part of 
international customary law. 
 
Firstly, this requires an assessment of whether or not a right of humanitarian 
intervention existed prior to the UN Charter, and if this right has survived the Charter. 
Different arguments of the survival of a right of intervention are presented by legal 
authors,
60
 but the majority of scholars argue against this, pointing to the fact that 
evidence of this right cannot be found.
61
 That a right of unauthorized interventions did 
not exist was also determined by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, where the Court 
said that the alleged right of intervention ―cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organization, find a place in international law‖.62  
The conclusion is therefore that a right of humanitarian intervention did not exist prior 
to the UN Charter. 
 
The next subject to be considered is if a right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention 
has evolved after the adoption of the Charter. 
 
The prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter has now considerable 
support as a principle of jus cogens.
63
 According to the Vienna Convention Article 53, a 
norm of jus cogens can only be modified by another norm of jus cogens. For a right of 
unauthorized humanitarian intervention to be legal, the right has to have the status of jus 
cogens. The right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention was dismissed by the ICJ 
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in the Nicaragua v. The United States case,
64
 and no state practice shows that a right of 
unauthorized humanitarian intervention has gained the status of jus cogens.
65
 
 
The conclusion is that there is no right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention in 
international customary law. 
 
Unauthorized humanitarian interventions are thereby not a lawful use of force in 
international law. 
 
2.4  Sovereignty 
One of the main obstacles to the right of humanitarian intervention has been the 
principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been recognized as a principle of 
customary law. Traditionally, in international law sovereignty was understood as legal 
independence from all foreign powers.
66
 This understanding is strongly influenced by 
Bodin‘s definition of sovereignty as ―the absolute and perpetual power of a state‖.67   
Sovereignty is now embodied in the UN Charter Article 2(1) as one of the main 
principles of the Charter.
68
 Article 2(1) states the ―sovereign equality‖ of its Members 
and codifies the legal right of states to conduct their internal affairs without outside 
interference. However, the UN Charter also led to a change in the perception of 
sovereignty. The traditional definition of sovereignty included the right to go to war,
69
 
but Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force.  Sovereignty thus became a 
limited concept and subject to international law. Another limitation of the principle of 
sovereignty was the development of the protection of human rights. As one of the main 
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purposes of the UN Charter, the protection of human rights became a responsibility for 
the international community.  
 
This leads to the question if sovereignty has become conditional on the respect of 
human rights.  
 
The formulation of the principle of sovereignty in the Charter does not give support to a 
conditional right of sovereignty. Article 2(1) says that the UN is based upon the 
―sovereign equality of all its Members‖ without placing any limitations on this 
principle. Nevertheless, the Security Council‘s practice of military response to 
humanitarian crises may indicate that sovereignty is linked to the respect of human 
rights.
70
 On the other hand, the Council‘s lack of action in many situations where 
human rights have been violated might indicate that sovereignty outweighs human 
rights. 
 
It is also argued that the principle of sovereignty has the status of jus cogens and can 
thus not be derogated from.
71
 This implies that all humanitarian interventions are illegal, 
without regards to the gravity of human rights abuses that might be carried out inside a 
state. The view of such absolute sovereignty seems incompatible with the Charter‘s 
commitment to promoting ―universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all‖,72 which rather indicates that sovereignty comes with a 
responsibility to protect human rights.
73
  
 
The conflict between sovereignty and the protection of human rights was the 
background for Secretary- General Kofi Annan‘s speech to the General Assembly on 
the 54
th
 session of the UN General Assembly in 1999. Annan addressed the problems 
with sovereignty and human rights, and said: 
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 ―State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of 
globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at 
the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by 
which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and 
subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness 
of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim 
is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them‖.74 
 
In this particular sense, sovereignty cannot be understood as an absolute obstacle to 
external interference when the aim is to protect individuals from human right abuses.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that the development of the protection of human rights has 
influenced the concept of sovereignty. With that in mind, sovereignty is still one of the 
fundamental principles of international law, both as a principle of customary law and as 
a principle of the UN Charter.   
 
2.5  Is it possible to establish criteria on humanitarian intervention? 
One of the most difficult and debated issues concerning humanitarian intervention is the 
criteria for when to intervene. Although many agree that there exists, in some cases, a 
right to intervene there is little consensus on which situations trigger this right.  
 
As mentioned above, the UN Charter does not mention humanitarian intervention 
explicitly and does not establish any criteria for humanitarian intervention.  
 
Several scholars have attempted to establish possible criteria for humanitarian 
intervention. One of the latest attempts was made by the ICISS in its report on the R2P. 
The first principle the ICISS sets out is that there must be ―serious and irreparable 
harm‖ of either ―large scale loss of life‖ or ―large scale ethnic cleansing‖.75 The ICISS 
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refers to this as the just cause threshold, and similar formulations can be found by legal 
authors who outline possible criteria.
76
  
 
The ICISS further laid down that there must be a rightful intent, military intervention 
must be the last resort, and there must be proportionality in means as well as a 
reasonable chance of success.
77
 Similar criteria can also be found in legal writings,
78
 but 
neither these nor the criteria established by the ICISS have been affirmed as legally 
binding. 
 
If such criteria should be established, there would also be a problem in regards to the 
content. Even if an agreement that there must be ―serious and irreparable harm‖ could 
be reached, the question of which situations fulfill this criterion would remain. This 
illustrates problems that need to be solved if there shall be a legalization of criteria on 
humanitarian intervention. However, attempts such as those by ICISS show that it may 
be possible to establish criteria on humanitarian intervention in the future.   
3 The intervention in Somalia 
3.1 Course of events 
After the coup by Aideed and Mahdi, the United Somali Congress (USC) installed 
Mahdi as President. Aideed, who was the military leader of the USC, challenged 
Mahdi‘s right to presidency, which caused war to break out. The worst fighting took 
place between November 1991 and March 1992, and during this period, UN 
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humanitarian agencies left Somalia as they feared for the security of the UN 
personnel.
79
  
 
On 23 January 1992, the UN Security Council declared that the situation in Somalia 
constituted a ―threat to international peace and security‖ and established an arms 
embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter.
80
 However, this did not stop the fighting, as 
armed gangs occupied the streets of Mogadishu and the city collapsed in a state of 
lawlessness. The UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali then announced that the UN was 
sending troops to Somalia with or without the consent of the faction leaders.
81
 This 
represented a shift from the previous strategy of negotiations, and was not welcomed by 
Aideed who refused to protect the 500 peacekeepers who arrived in September.
82
 
 
The international involvement in Somalia took a new turn in mid- 1992 when the Bush 
Sr. Administration declared that the ―starvation in Somalia is a major human tragedy‖ 
and that the U.S. would provide food for ―those who desperately need it‖.83 The turning 
point that led to this statement was a telegram from the U.S. ambassador in Kenya 
describing the situation in Somali refugees‘ camps along the Kenyan border.84 The 
intense media attention that Bush‘s statement created and the fact that Somalia was 
perceived as a low-risk, short-term operation created the backdrop for the U.S. plea to 
the UN for a mandate to send 30,000 troops to Somalia to provide protection for 
humanitarian relief.
85
 
 
The U.S. offer resulted in Security Council Resolution 794 which authorized the 
Member States to use ―all necessary means‖, and thereby the use of force under Chapter 
VII. The Secretary-General pointed to the lack of an existing government in Somalia 
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who could ask for assistance, and therefore a need for the UN to take the decision.
86
 
Nevertheless, the resolution makes 18 references to the ―humanitarian‖ aspect which 
illustrates that the main reason for acting was humanitarian. The resolution then 
authorizes the use of force on the grounds that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is a 
threat to ―international peace and security‖ creating a historic precedent for the 
development of humanitarian intervention. At the same time, the resolution recognizes 
―the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its 
deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and 
exceptional response‖.87  
 
The resolution created the United Task Force (UNITAF) and the U.S. led Operation 
Restore Hope. Despite the signing of a ceasefire, the fighting continued, and the UN 
decided to extend its mandate. On 26 March 1993, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 814, authorizing UN troops to act under Chapter VII in order to establish the 
rule of law, to create a secure environment in Somalia and to ensure compliance by all 
Somali parties.
88
 To achieve this goal, the Secretary General agreed to deploy 20,000 
peacekeepers in the establishment of UNOSOM II.
89
 
 
UNOSOM II faced heavy opposition, especially from Aideed and the Somali National 
Alliance (SNA). On 3 October 1993 U.S. Rangers launched an attack against Aideed 
that killed over 500 Somalis. Eighteen U.S. Rangers were also killed in the firefight, 
and on television the world saw pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu.
90
 This led to strong criticism of the intervention, and 
President Clinton announced that all U.S forces would be withdrawn by 31 March 
1994.
91
 Without having restored the rule of law in Somalia, and having experienced 
casualties, the UN could not ensure further support for its ambitious mission. On 4 
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November 1994, after failed peacekeeping efforts, the Security Council voted 
unanimously to withdraw all forces from Somalia.
92
 
 
3.2 Was the intervention in Somalia a lawful humanitarian intervention? 
The first question is whether or not the intervention in Somalia qualifies as a 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
This thesis has established that a humanitarian intervention has to be conducted with 
aims of ending widespread deprivations of international recognized human rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens, without the consent from the state being 
intervened and involving the use of armed force by international organizations or states.   
 
Resolutions 794 and 814 authorized the use of force, and were followed by a forceful 
intervention by the UN and the U.S. Hence, it is clear that the intervention in Somalia 
involved the use of force by a state and an international organization.  
 
Furthermore, there must be widespread deprivations of international recognized human 
rights.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 6 says that every 
human being has the ―inherent right to life‖, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Article 11.2 recognizes the ―fundamental right of everyone to be free 
from hunger‖.93 In 1992, Somalia was in a state of lawlessness, without a functioning 
government, and with a clan-based civil war that devastated the country. The warlords 
prevented aid from being distributed, and tens of thousands of people were dispossessed 
when the armies plundered villages.
94
 Somalia was also heavily affected by a drought 
and famine which killed hundreds of thousands of people. The lack of food and the 
massive killings deprived the people of Somalia of, among other things, the ―inherent 
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right to life‖ and the right to ―be free from hunger‖. The situation in Somalia thus 
constituted widespread deprivations of international recognized human rights.  
 
Thirdly, the intervention has to be conducted with the aim of ending violations of 
human rights of individuals other than its own citizens. This refers to the motive behind 
the intervention. Legal scholars acknowledge that the findings of other non-
humanitarian motives do not disqualify the intervention as humanitarian as long as the 
intervention was conducted with aims of ending human rights violations.
95
 
 
The question is therefore whether the U.S. and the UN intervened with aims of ending 
widespread deprivations of international recognized human rights of individuals other 
than its own citizens. 
 
First, the thesis will address the U.S. motivations for intervening. Important factors 
seemed to be intense media-attention towards the humanitarian emergency in Somalia 
and the description of the situation in Somali refugees‘ camps. Another important factor 
was that Somalia was considered a low-risk and short-term operation.  At a National 
Security Council meeting in November, Acting Secretary of State said that ―we could 
do this… at not too great a cost and, certainly, without any great danger of body bags 
coming home‖.96 Around this time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also agreed to 
support a military intervention if the operation was limited to protecting the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in certain regions of Somalia, and if a UN peacekeeping force would 
take over shortly after Clinton became President.
97
 These conditions illustrate another 
factor that impacted the decision to intervene; Bush was coming to an end of his 
Presidency and it is widely accepted that concern for his legacy was a contributing 
factor.
98
 Another side of this is that the intervention in Somalia would likely deflect 
attention from Bush‘s inaction over the atrocities committed in Bosnia.99  
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All these factors had an impact on the Bush Administration‘s decision to intervene, but 
the diversity of factors does not necessarily rule out the humanitarian concerns as the 
primary motive. There seems to be no hidden power or political motives, and most 
scholars agree that the original U.S. purpose for intervening was motivated by 
humanitarian concerns.
100
 Furthermore it is clear that the intervention was conducted to 
protect individuals other than its own citizens. The humanitarian concern for the people 
of Somalia was emphasized by Bush‘s statement when he addressed the nation after 
Resolution 794 was passed: ―The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, 
need our help. We‘re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give 
them hope. America must act‖.101 
 
The conclusion is therefore that the U.S. intervened with aims of ending widespread 
deprivations of international recognized human rights of individuals other than its own 
citizens. 
 
Secondly, the thesis will look at the UN motives for intervening in Somalia. It follows 
from the preamble of Resolution 794 that the reason for authorizing force was that ―the 
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated 
by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security‖.102 Although the hunt for Aideed later 
contradicted the humanitarian purposes that led to the intervention, it is clear that the 
UN authorized the use of force for the purpose of ending human rights violations of the 
people of Somalia. 
 
The question is if the lack of a government in Somalia, which could either consent or 
oppose the intervention, disqualifies the intervention as a humanitarian intervention. 
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As mentioned above, an intervention is carried out without the consent of the state being 
intervened. If the state in question consents to the use of force one cannot label the use 
of force as an intervention. In regards to the adoption of Resolution 794, Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali wrote to the Security Council: ―[a]t present no government 
exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It would therefore be 
necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the 
Charter that a threat to the peace exists… and to decide what measures should be taken 
to maintain international peace and security‖.103 The Secretary-General here takes the 
stand that in the absence of a functioning government the Security Council must act 
instead. Although there was no possibility for a Somali government to consent to the 
use of force, one still has to relate to the fact that the intervention was conducted 
without consent. Thus, the lack of an existing government in Somalia does not 
disqualify the intervention as a humanitarian intervention. 
 
The conclusion is that the intervention in Somalia qualifies as a humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
The next question is whether the humanitarian intervention in Somalia was lawful. 
 
The starting point is the UN Charter and its prohibition against the use of force. Article 
2(4) together with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in Articles 2(1) 
and 2(7) make forceful interventions in other states incompatible with the Charter. 
Chapter VII makes an exception to this in Article 42, which gives the Security Council 
the power to authorize the use of force in cases of ―threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression‖.104 Resolutions 794 and 814 were authorized by the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII on grounds that the situation in Somalia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security,
105
 and is as such in compliance 
with Article 42. 
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The question is therefore if the intervention in Somalia meets the criteria of necessity 
and proportionality. 
 
In regards to the question of necessity, the first subject to be assessed is if the Security 
Council‘s decision to resort to force was necessary. As mentioned above, this means 
that the decision to use force has to be the last resort. Hence, one has to look at whether 
or not peaceful measures had been tried and if they were successful.  
 
Even though the UN‘s first response to the conflict was to pull out its personnel during 
the fighting in 1990-1991, the UN later led several attempts to solve the conflict with 
peaceful measures. 
 
On 3 March 1992, Undersecretary General Jonah negotiated a ceasefire between Mahdi 
and Aideed, and for a short while Mogadishu experienced a semblance of calm.
106
 
Unfortunately, the ceasefire was not complied with, and the fighting again escalated. 
The Secretary- General then sent his Special Representative Shanoun, who established 
good relations with the warlords and believed that Somalia‘s problems could be 
resolved through diplomacy.
107
 He also made the faction leaders agree to the 
deployment of 500 peacekeepers. Shanoun was making progress with the faction 
leaders, and one might argue that if given more time he could have convinced them to 
allow a stronger peacekeeping force and thus avoid a forceful intervention. On the other 
hand, Shanoun‘s attempt to work with the Somali tradition of lengthy negotiations and 
consultations may not have been the appropriate strategy in a humanitarian crisis where 
thousands of people died every day.
108
 The Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 
Embassy in Mogadishu argued that although Shanoun was making progress, by mid-
1992 diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict were already too late.
109
 This implies that 
peaceful measures were no longer enough, and that at the time the decision to use force 
was made, there was a need for a stronger response. Bearing in mind the broad margin 
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of appreciation of the Security Council, the conclusion is that the decision to resort to 
force was necessary. 
 
Secondly, the question is whether the means of force used during the intervention was 
necessary.  
 
In order for the use of force during the intervention in Somalia to be considered 
necessary one has to look at the balance between demands of military necessity and 
considerations of humanity.
110
  
 
In December 1992, the U.S. announced that it would send 28,000 troops to Somalia to 
safeguard humanitarian operations, and on 9 December the first troops arrived in 
Mogadishu.
111
 President Bush‘s desire to have the UN take over as soon as possible 
ensured that Operation Restore Hope was restricted to the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
Although disarmament of the warlords and the restoration of the rule of law were 
crucial to helping the people of Somalia, this required a long-term commitment and a 
risk of losing soldiers‘ lives that was unacceptable to the U.S. administration.112 This 
strategy meant that the probability of producing successful results diminished, but it 
also laid a constraint on the means of force used and implies that the force used was 
necessary.    
 
The main controversy is the hunt for Aideed because it contradicted the humanitarian 
motives behind the intervention. The hunt for Aideed started when UN peacekeepers 
were killed by the SNA after an inspection of a SNA arms depot.
113
 This led to the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 837 that condemned the attacks and authorized 
―all necessary measures against all those responsible‖.114 In the hunt for Aideed, U.S. 
air attacks against SNA forces killed over 100 Somalis, including women and 
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children.
115
 Furthermore, over 500 Somalis were killed on 3 October in an attack against 
a hotel. Air attacks against civilian locations and the loss of civilian lives are clearly not 
in correspondence with securing humanitarian relief operations and saving people from 
famine and diseases. This leads to the argument that there was not a balance between 
military necessity and considerations of humanity. 
 
On the other hand, the means of force used during the intervention contributed to saving 
many lives that would otherwise have been lost,
116
 and this strongly implies that the 
means of force used was necessary. Moreover, considerations of humanity also became 
apparent through the attempts made by UNOSOM II to address the underlying causes of 
the humanitarian crisis when given a mandate in Resolution 814 to rebuild the state.  
 
Although some elements of the intervention involved unnecessary means, seen as a 
whole, one can conclude that the intervention had a balance between demands of 
military necessity and considerations of humanity, and thereby fulfills the criterion of 
necessity.   
 
The next question is if the intervention meets the criterion of proportionality.  
 
In regards to the Security Council‘s decision to authorize force, one has to bear in mind 
the Council‘s margin of appreciation when deciding what measures to take. Resolution 
794 was passed with the aim of ensuring humanitarian relief to the Somali people and 
authorized the employment of UNITAF and Operation Restore Hope.
117
 With regards to 
the humanitarian crisis in Somalia at that time, it seems clear that the decision to 
authorize troops was proportional to the aim of ensuring humanitarian relief. 
Resolution 814 was adopted with the aim of creating a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief in Somalia, and gave a broad mandate to UNOSOM II as the troops 
were authorized to assist in the reestablishment of the civil administration and police 
force, to establish the rule of law and to promote political reconciliation.
118
 The wide 
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mandate given to UNOSOM II may indicate that the decision was not proportionate to 
the aim of ensuring safety for humanitarian relief. Still, as shown above, the situation in 
Somalia had not improved in any significant way during the prior attempts to establish a 
safe environment in the country. Instead, the situation deteriorated, and thus if the UN 
should have any realistic goals of improving the situation it would require a stronger 
commitment. As Chapter VII gives the UN a broad margin of appreciation to consider 
the proportionality of its decision, the conclusion is that the decision laid down in 
Resolution 814 was proportionate.   
 
The next question is if the means of force used during the intervention in Somalia was 
proportionate. 
 
This question requires an assessment of the excessiveness of the use of force in relation 
to the advantage anticipated.
119
  
 
The main debate here relates to excessiveness of the use of force in the hunt for Aideed 
where the troops killed hundreds of civilians in various failed attempts. Such aggressive 
use of force without achieving any results implies that the use of force was not 
proportional. Even though they anticipated catching Aideed, one might still argue that 
the bombing of civilian locations was not proportionate. The troops arrived in Somalia 
to help the people affected by the humanitarian crisis, not to capture warlords. Seen in 
this context, the use of force seems disproportional. 
 
On the other hand, the attempts to capture Aideed constituted only a small part of the 
intervention. The purpose of the intervention was to protect humanitarian relief 
operations, and in regards to this, the use of force did not seem too excessive. While the 
presence of some 20,000 soldiers and peacekeepers can be regarded as a massive use of 
force, it was merely enough to provide aid and restore order. This implies that the use of 
force was proportionate in relation to the advantage anticipated of saving civilian lives.  
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While one has to acknowledge that the use of force during the intervention caused 
civilian losses, it is undisputed that the intervention also saved many civilian lives.
120
 A 
holistic evaluation of the intervention thereby leads to the conclusion that the means of 
force used during the intervention in Somalia was proportionate. 
 
The humanitarian intervention in Somalia gained legality through its authorization by 
the Security Council and its use of force complied with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. The conclusion is therefore that the intervention in Somalia was a 
lawful humanitarian intervention. 
4 What significance does the intervention have in regards to the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention and later interventions? 
4.1 In regards to the legal status of humanitarian intervention 
The starting point for the discussion on the legal status of humanitarian intervention is 
the UN Charter. The intervention in Somalia did not contribute to any changes in the 
Charter, and thus the conflict between the principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
and the protection of human rights continues. 
 
Nevertheless, the intervention in Somalia might have had an impact on the Security 
Council‘s practice under Chapter VII. The Council‘s decisions on when to intervene are 
important for the development of humanitarian intervention. The Council has the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and its 
decision for when to authorize an intervention has major significance for the legality 
and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. An extensive practice of intervening for 
humanitarian purposes will contribute to the development of humanitarian intervention, 
while decisions to not intervene emphasize the importance of sovereignty and non-
intervention.  
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The most important resolutions by the Security Council in Somalia are Resolutions 794 
and 814. 
 
As mentioned above, resolution 794 has its significance for the development of 
humanitarian intervention as the first time the Security Council authorized the use of 
force explicitly on humanitarian grounds without the consent of a government. This 
represents an important step for the UN in regards to acknowledging the magnitude of 
human rights and their significance in the international community. The resolution 
shows that the Council may authorize the use of force without consent from the 
intervened state when human rights are at stake, and can thus serve as an important 
precedent for future situations.  
 
However, the fact that there was no existing government in Somalia that could either 
consent or object to the intervention may reduce the resolution‘s importance. This was 
emphasized by members who were concerned that this case would set a new precedent 
for humanitarian intervention. The resolution talks about the ―unique‖, ―extraordinary‖ 
and ―exceptional‖ aspects of the Somalia case,121 words that illustrated concerns that the 
resolution opened up for eroding the rules of non-intervention.
122
 Resolution 794 did not 
mention Article 2(7) which reflects the view that the resolution did not breach the rules 
of non-intervention since the Somali government no longer existed. On the other side, 
the fact that there is no government does not mean that there is no state to intervene in. 
Additionally, the lack of a functioning government in Somalia is not mentioned in the 
resolution. The use of force is authorized because the ―magnitude of the human tragedy 
caused by the conflict in Somalia…constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security‖. It is clear that the internal humanitarian crisis in Somalia calls for the use of 
force, and Resolution 794 is thereby a pioneer resolution in the history of the Security 
Council. Furthermore, it is only ―unique‖ and ―extraordinary‖ situations that call for an 
intervention, and recognizing the uniqueness of the situation in Somalia can therefore 
not take away the resolution‘s precedential importance. 
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Another aspect of Resolution 794 is that even though the resolution refers to the 
situation in Somalia as a ―threat to international peace and security‖, there are no 
explicit references to circumstances in Somalia that actually threaten international peace 
and security. This implies that the Security Council regards human rights abuses inside 
a state as threats to the peace in themselves.
123
 This emphasizes the resolution‘s 
importance for the Security Council‘s practice on humanitarian intervention.   
 
The resolution was authorized because of the suffering caused by the breakdown of 
civic authority, and not a state abusing its citizens. The lack of a functioning 
government thus puts the Somalia case in another category than interventions conducted 
on the basis of human rights abuses by the state. This might weaken the resolution‘s 
precedence for the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Still, 
regardless of the background of the resolution it still has importance for the evolution of 
humanitarian intervention as it opened up for authorizing the use of force without 
consent in a humanitarian emergency. 
 
The authorization of Resolution 814 is also significant for the Security Council‘s 
practice of intervening. 
The resolution notes the ―continuing reports of widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia‖ and determines 
that ―the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region‖. In 
requesting the troops to assist in the ―re-establishment of national and regional 
institutions‖ and ―the re-establishment of Somali police…the restoration and 
maintenance of peace, stability and law and order‖, this was the most ambitious 
mandate ever given to a UN mission. The resolution showed how far the Council was 
willing to interfere in a state‘s internal affairs in order to rebuild the state and establish 
the rule of law. Resolution 814 also tried not only to ease the suffering in Somalia, but 
to address the root causes of the suffering, and Somalia thus represented the most 
obvious case where the UN took on new duties to build the world order.
124
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The resolution is significant for the legal status of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention because it illustrates that nation building can be a part of humanitarian 
intervention. The mandate given to UNOSOM II in this resolution can also illustrate the 
weight the Security Council places on its role as a promoter of human rights. On the 
other hand, UNOSOM II did not manage to fulfill its mission to rebuild Somalia, and 
when the troops left, Somalia did not have a functioning government. The failed 
mission might reduce the resolution‘s significance as it shows the difficulties with 
nation building as a part of humanitarian intervention.  
 
The conclusion is that although their importance might be weakened by the special 
circumstances in Somalia and the lack of success in rebuilding the state, Resolutions 
794 and 814 were historical for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The 
resolutions also had a significant contribution to the development of the Security 
Council‘s practice on humanitarian intervention. 
 
In regards to international customary law, the thesis has shown that there was no prior 
right of humanitarian intervention in international customary law before the intervention 
in Somalia. The intervention in Somalia was authorized by the Security Council and can 
thereby not contribute to a new norm of unauthorized interventions. As for a norm of 
authorized interventions, the Council‘s powers are exclusively regulated by the UN 
Charter, and a norm of authorized interventions can thereby not develop as customary 
law.
125
  
 
Nevertheless, the intervention in Somalia may contribute to the development of the 
legal status of humanitarian intervention if it gained legitimacy for the case of 
humanitarian intervention. Legitimacy can serve as a justification to act, based on a 
moral obligation, even if there is not a legal justification. The intervention in Somalia 
had a legal justification in the UN Charter, but it might also contribute to the 
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development of humanitarian intervention in general if the intervention gained such 
legitimacy.       
 
The question is then if the intervention in Somalia contributed to increasing the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  
 
Proponents of humanitarian intervention often highlight the fact that the intervention 
was undertaken in a country of little or no strategic or economic importance to the 
intervener.
126
 In previous interventions, the intervener has often been accused of 
intervening to protect own interests instead of protecting human rights. Such 
accusations diminish the status of humanitarian intervention and have been an obstacle 
to its development.  
 
The intervention can thereby contribute to the development of humanitarian intervention 
as the U.S. and the UN did not have any strategic or economic interests in Somalia. 
Nevertheless, this would be a stronger argument if they had responded earlier to the 
humanitarian crisis. There were arguments in the U.S. administration for actions at an 
earlier stage,
127
 and an earlier response might have saved more lives. Moreover, there is 
nothing that indicates that the U.S. would have intervened if this would have weakened 
their interests, and as mentioned earlier there were other motives than purely 
humanitarians that were decisive for the intervention.  
 
Most of the criticism towards the U.S. intervention is based on the fact that when they 
experienced a low number of casualties the administration decided to withdraw. The 
intervention in Somalia probably saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but after only 36 
casualties Clinton decided to pull the troops out.
128
 This can illustrate that when no 
strategic or economic interests is at stake the commitment to humanitarian norms may 
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be undermined by using means that prioritize to avoid casualties. This led to strategies 
that minimized American casualties but cost more civilian lives.
129
  
In general, these circumstances may reduce the interventions legitimacy. The fact that 
the U.S. and the UN intervened in a state where they had no interests can serve as a 
positive impact on the doctrine, but then again this is reduced by their reluctance to 
accept the necessary risks. Seen as a whole, the intervention therefore mainly has its 
importance for the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as being 
authorized by the Security Council.  
 
4.2 In regards to later interventions  
 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention develops not only through treaty law, but also 
through the practice of intervening during human rights abuses and humanitarian crisis. 
Even though the intervention in Somalia did not change treaty law or customary law, it 
might have had an impact on the doctrine as contributing to a practice of intervening. 
This can again lead to changes in international law. 
 
This part of the thesis will discuss whether the intervention in Somalia has had any 
significance for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as contributing to a practice of 
intervening. The most obvious case in relations to this is the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994, which occurred shortly after the intervention in Somalia. This was a case of 
humanitarian crisis, such as Somalia, to which the international community responded 
differently. While the UN took action in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda is 
remembered as an example of inaction from the outside world. The question here is if 
the intervention in Somalia had any impact on the international response to this crisis. 
 
When genocide broke out in Rwanda in early 1994 the UN was still preoccupied with 
the operations in Somalia. The political climate in the UN was thus not optimal for 
another involvement in a difficult ethnic conflict. Especially the U.S. opposed any 
involvement in Rwanda. Two days before the Security Council discussed to send a 
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peacekeeping force to Rwanda, 18 U.S. Rangers were killed in the October 3 firefight in 
Somalia. This led to a powerful resistance in the U.S. against participation and support 
for UN operations.
130
   
 
When the Council met on 20 April 1994 to discuss UNAMIR‘s future, Somalia was on 
the table. The British Ambassador opposed intervention and reminded the UN to ―think 
back to Somalia and about what you would ask these troops to do‖.131 The Security 
Council agreed unanimously the next day to reduce UNAMIR to a troop of 270.
132
  
Furthermore, the general view in the UN seemed to be that no one wanted another 
involvement like Somalia at this time. In a BBC interview a senior advisor in the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), stated that the DPKO‘s view was 
―not Somalia again‖.133  
 
These circumstances lead to the conclusion that the intervention in Somalia was highly 
decisive for the decision not to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda.  
 
The UN finally responded to the crisis when France offered to lead a multinational force 
and intervene in Rwanda. The French Prime Minister stated that France would not lead 
such an intervention if not given an explicit Security Council authorization,
134
 and in 
Resolution 929 the Council gave authorization to use ―all necessary means‖.135 The 
intervention, named Operation Turquoise, soon became criticized as coming too late 
and not employing the right means.
136
  
 
The question is thus why the intervention in Somalia had such an impact on the 
international response to the genocide in Rwanda.  
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The lack of timely interference in Rwanda illustrates the magnitude of the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention and the lack of protection of human rights. The 
intervention in Somalia might have had an impact on the weighting of these principles. 
  
Firstly, the intervention in Somalia led to reluctance to accept casualties in order to 
protect human rights. Especially for American decision makers, this stood in the way of 
intervention. It has been claimed that the loss of soldiers in Somalia shocked the 
American public in a way that the Administration had to rethink its foreign policies.
137
 
It seemed that the consequences of the intervention in Somalia led to a balancing of 
principles where the protection of human rights was no longer as important. 
 
Secondly, the intervention in Somalia started out with high expectations, and the failure 
to reach these might have had significance in the decision not to intervene in Rwanda.  
Early efforts to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia went well, and thus the mission 
may have gotten unrealistic expectations and looked misleadingly easy. When the 
troops then experienced casualties, this led to a perception of defeat.
138
 This might have 
led to an opposition against interference in Rwanda. One can also argue that the loss of 
casualties and the unsuccessful attempts of restoring the rule of law in Somalia 
overshadowed the positive humanitarian outcomes. In this political climate, it was 
difficult to achieve support for another intervention. 
 
Thus, it seems like the international community in the aftermath of Somalia did not 
view human rights important enough to triumph the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention. 
 
In regards to Operation Turquoise, one can see similarities to, and influences from, the 
intervention in Somalia in the Security Council. 
 
In both instances, the Security Council authorized states to lead multinational forces 
after proposals from the U.S. and France. This shows that the Council views states as 
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competent and appropriate to conduct interventions. Furthermore, when authorizing 
Operation Turquoise the Council explicitly stressed that the operation should be 
―impartial and neutral‖.139 Accusations of impartiality from Aideed caused severe 
problems during the intervention in Somalia,
140
 and this might be a reason why the 
Council stressed the importance of this when authorizing an intervention in Rwanda.   
The two situations also illustrate how the Council‘s practice in cases of humanitarian 
interventions is influenced by the political climate. While the Council put human rights 
above sovereignty and non-intervention in Somalia, it did the opposite in Rwanda. Even 
when Resolution 929 finally was authorized, five countries abstained.
141
 The political 
climate in the Council was not open for another intervention, and this resulted in the 
choice of sovereignty and non-intervention above the protection of human rights.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that the intervention in Somalia played a major role in the 
decision not to intervene timely in Rwanda. Especially the loss of soldiers in Somalia, 
and the sense of failure in restoring the society were important factors that led to 
inaction in Rwanda. In regards to contributing to a practice of intervening, the 
intervention in Somalia influenced the Security Council when authorizing Resolution 
929. However, the lack of timely action significantly weakened the intervention in 
Somalia as a contribution to a practice of intervening in the case of Rwanda.    
5 De lege ferenda; Humanitarian interventions in the future 
 
In many parts of the world people suffer from conflicts and are deprived of their 
fundamental human rights. This part of the thesis will explore whether or not 
humanitarian intervention could be a suitable solution to such situations based on the 
lessons learned from Somalia. 
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First and foremost, the intervention in Somalia became possible because of Security 
Council authorization and illustrates the importance of the role of the Security Council 
for humanitarian intervention. In future situations where an intervention presents an 
alternative; authorization by the Security Council should be the obvious option. 
However, a decision by the Council is not only a legal decision, but rests heavily on 
political choices. This might be an obstacle to authorizing a humanitarian intervention. 
This is illustrated by the situation in the region of Darfur in Sudan, where over 300,000 
people have been killed and 2,5 million people have fled their homes.
142
 The crisis, 
which the U.S. has labeled genocide, is an ethnic-based conflict where the government 
is supporting the militia.
143
 The Security Council has been criticized for inaction which 
is often caused by China, the main foreign investor in Sudan‘s oil industry, blocking 
action towards the Sudan government.
144
 Even though the Council has authorized a 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur,
145
 the political situation in the Security Council is an 
obstacle to more decisive action. If the Security Council shall be able to authorize a 
humanitarian intervention in situations such as Darfur, there needs to be an agreement in 
the Council to prioritize human rights above political and economic considerations.  
 
Secondly, the intervention in Somalia illustrates the importance of acknowledging the 
complexity of the conflict. If deciding to intervene, there need to be an understanding 
that a humanitarian intervention often demands a long-term commitment. Learning from 
Somalia, one cannot overlook the underlying reasons of the conflict. For example, 
Sudan has been in a state of war almost continuously since the country gained its 
independence, and ethnic divisions, religious differences, and economic inequality have 
caused frictions between the tribes.
146
 All these factors make a humanitarian 
intervention complex and difficult. Inevitably, this leads to a comprehensive and long-
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term commitment from the international community, which again makes political 
support for an intervention more unlikely.  
 
The experiences from the intervention in Somalia make it clear that an intervention 
should be authorized by the Security Council and needs to address all aspects of the 
conflict. If the international community can agree upon such an intervention, it should 
have good prospects of succeeding.  
 
Furthermore, future humanitarian interventions may gain from a change in the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention, for instance by the R2P. If the R2P develops into a 
legal framework, it may establish criteria for humanitarian intervention and create a 
legal obligation to react to humanitarian emergencies. In this regards, the intervention in 
Somalia has had significance as the R2P threshold was elaborated on the experiences 
from Somalia and other humanitarian crises during the 1990s.
147
 However, even though 
the Security Council has made references to the R2P in several resolutions,
148
 the 
present formulation of the R2P is not legally binding and merely serves as a political 
and moral statement. Still, the development of the R2P illustrates that it may be possible 
to create a legal framework on humanitarian intervention in the future.  
6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis illustrates how humanitarian intervention is a struggle between fundamental 
principles of non-intervention, sovereignty, the prohibition of the use of force and the 
protection of human rights. All these principles have their foundation in the UN Charter, 
and the intervention in Somalia is a result of the Security Council‘s weighting of these 
principles. Especially the adoption of Resolution 794 had tremendous importance for 
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the Security Council‘s practice of intervening, as it authorized the use of force explicitly 
on humanitarian grounds without the consent of a government.   
 
The humanitarian intervention in Somalia did not result in a change in the UN Charter, 
but it contributed to the discussion on humanitarian intervention. All changes in the law 
are built on discussions, thus the intervention in Somalia is important for the 
development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
 
The intervention in Somalia further illustrates advantages and disadvantages of 
humanitarian intervention. For example the intervention saved many lives and 
contributed to ending a humanitarian catastrophe, but it also cost lives, both civilian and 
those of the troops. It also revealed how difficult it is to intervene with aims of restoring 
a state. These will be valuable lessons both for future interventions and for the debate 
on humanitarian intervention. Learning from Somalia, it is important to remember that 
the use of force shall always be the last resort, and that humanitarian intervention is not 
a short-cut to peace. However, with this in mind, humanitarian intervention can be a 
legal and legitimate way of ending human rights abuses.  
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